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Report 26 June 2025

Everywhere Women Are Being Restricted

Human rights violations against Rohingya women human rights defenders in Bangladesh.

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Key figures
100%of the women defenders interviewed face restrictions on expression and assembly
52%experienced online gender-based violence
29Rohingya women human rights defenders interviewed
1 million+Rohingya refugees in the camps of Cox’s Bazar

Figures from this report (BHRN, 27 June 2025).

The full report
Cover: Everywhere Women Are Being Restricted

Photo: A Rohingya artist paints a mural on a bamboo shelter in a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Many Rohingya women and girls use art and informal education initiatives to raise awareness of rights violations and document life in the camps. © Abdullah Bawshore

In this report
  1. Executive Summary
  2. Background
  3. Methodology
  4. Human Rights Violations
  5. Recommendations

1Executive Summary

Rohingya women human rights defenders (WHRDs) in Bangladesh face severe restrictions, violence, and threats from both state and non-state actors. Despite the essential role they play in advocating for their communities, they are systematically repressed by Bangladeshi authorities, criminal and militant groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and conservative social norms that seek to silence them. WHRDs who speak out about human rights abuses, seek justice, or engage in civil society work face intimidation, surveillance, and targeted attacks. In the words of one Rohingya woman interviewed by BHRN: “Everywhere women are being restricted, and we are not allowed to do activities like men.”

The Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar, have faced decades of persecution and genocide. In 2017, the Myanmar military launched a genocidal campaign, forcing more than 730,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Today, nearly one million Rohingya refugees remain confined to overcrowded camps, where they face movement restrictions, limited access to education and employment, and an escalating crackdown on civil society. Rohingya women are particularly marginalized, excluded from leadership structures, and denied opportunities to advocate for their rights.

Since 2019, Bangladeshi authorities have intensified efforts to suppress Rohingya activism, shutting down organizations, preventing protests, and arresting activists. WHRDs face additional barriers due to their gender, with authorities preventing them from participating in meetings, advocacy, or engagement with international delegations. Women attempting to work with justice mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have been interrogated, harassed, and threatened by Bangladeshi security forces and Rohingya armed groups.

In addition to state repression, armed groups operate with impunity in the camps, targeting WHRDs through harassment, abductions, and physical violence. Women advocating for rights have been forced to sign pledges under duress, promising to stop their activism. Widows and unmarried women are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment and coercion.

Gender-based violence remains pervasive in the camps, with WHRDs reporting widespread sexual harassment, intimidation, and physical violence. Women who work outside their homes or speak out about rights violations are especially at risk. Despite Bangladesh ’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Rohingya women remain unprotected from violence and have no safe avenues to report abuses or seek justice. Many WHRDs report severe psychological distress, including suicidal thoughts, due to ongoing harassment and isolation.

Online gender- based violence further restricts WHRDs’ ability to advocate. More than half of those interviewed by BHRN reported experiencing online abuse, including cyberstalking, doxing, and threats. Rohingya armed groups like ARSA actively target women online, fabricating or leaking private photos to discredit and humiliate them. Many WHRDs have resorted to self-censorship, using pseudonyms or avoiding social media to protect themselves from further harm.

Despite hopes for change under Bangladesh’s interim government, which took power in August 2024, WHRDs report that conditions remain unchanged. Authorities continue to suppress civil society, while militant groups operate with impunity. The failure to protect Rohingya women from violence — whether from security forces, armed groups, or within their own communities — has left them in an increasingly vulnerable position. Yet, despite these risks, Rohingya WHRDs remain resolute in their fight for justice, equality, and the rights of their people. Without urgent intervention, they will continue to face extreme risks for simply exercising their fundamental rights.

Key findings

  • 100% of WHRDs interviewed reported facing restrictions on their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly in Bangladesh.
  • Bangladesh authorities have continued policies restricting Rohingya civil society under both the former Sheikh Hasina administration and the current interim government. WHRDs report ongoing intimidation, surveillance, and harassment by the Armed Police Battalion (APBN) and camp officials.
  • Rohingya WHRDs are systematically excluded from participating in decision- making processes within the camps, including meetings with Bangladeshi authorities and international delegations.
  • WHRDs attempting to meet with international justice mechanisms, such as the ICC and ICJ, have faced harassment, surveillance, and threats from Bangladeshi authorities and armed groups.
  • Women attempting to organize or participate in advocacy activities, including Genocide Remembrance Day events (in 2023 and 2024), were restricted from assembling. Some who tried to hold protests were threatened or forced to do so in secret.
  • ARSA and other armed groups in the camps retaliate against women who speak out, often through threats, abductions, or violence.
  • Nearly all WHRDs interviewed by BHRN are survivors of or witnesses to gender- based violence.
  • Women working outside their homes or speaking out on human rights issues are frequently targeted for harassment, threats, and physical violence.
  • WHRDs identified ARSA and other armed groups as one of the main perpetrators of violence against women, including abductions, extortion, and sexual violence.
  • Since the interim government came to power in August 2024, WHRDs report that the camps have become even more dangerous for women, with increased criminal and militant group activity. Bangladeshi security forces have done little to address these threats.
  • Widows and unmarried women are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment and forced relationships, often under threat of violence.
  • 52% of WHRDs interviewed reported experiencing online gender-based violence.
  • WHRDs rely on online platforms to advocate for human rights, but many face sexist hate speech, doxing, cyberstalking, identity theft, and direct threats — often leading to real-world violence.
  • Alleged ARSA members actively monitor, harass, and intimidate WHRDs online, including fabricating or leaking private photos to discredit them.
  • Several WHRDs reported that members or supporters of ARSA created fake accounts impersonating them, posting manipulated images and personal details to tarnish their reputations.
  • Women who post online about human rights issues or attend advocacy meetings face threats to themselves and their families, with some experiencing physical attacks or abductions as a direct consequence of their online activism.
  • WHRDs targeted by online abuse report severe psychological distress, self- censorship, and fear of further retaliation. Many now use pseudonyms, avoid posting, or hide their identities to protect themselves.

2Background

Rohingya in Myanmar

Myanmar is a predominately Buddhist country comprised of approximately 88 percent Theravada Buddhists, six percent Christians, and four percent Muslims (mostly Sunni).1 The Rohingya are an indigenous, predominantly Sunni Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar who have traditionally resided primarily in what is now known as Rakhine State.2

For decades, former Myanmar governments have used laws and policies to marginalise and dehumanise the Rohingya people.3 These discriminatory measures have drastically limited Rohingya's rights to movement, marriage, childbirth, formal education, and employment. The result, according to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Myanmar, was a “continuing situation of severe, systemic, and institutionalized oppression from birth to death” for the Rohingya.”4

The genocide against the Rohingya is ongoing, with both state and non-state actors subjecting Rohingya to systemic persecution, deprivation of rights, and continued violence. The 1982 Citizenship Law of Myanmar remains as one of the main tools of Rohingya exclusion in the country.5 Rohingya have not recognised as one of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups. Rohingya are now forced to go through the National Verification Card process that effectively categorizes them as “ foreigners. ”6

In addition to Myanmar’s system of state -sponsored, institutionalised discrimination against the Rohingya, the Myanmar military has engaged in several campaigns of atrocities against the Rohingya leading to the mass exodus of Rohingya refugees. In 2017, the Myanmar military launched a campaign of killings, mass rape and arson against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State which killed thousands and forced over 730,000 to flee to Bangladesh.7

The thousands of Rohingya who remained in Rakhine State after the 2017 genocide continue to face severe restrictions on freedom of movement, access to livelihoods, and other basic rights.8 The February 2021 coup by the Myanmar military (the entity responsible for the genocide against the Rohingya) has caused the already dire human rights situation of the Rohingya to deteriorate further.9

Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine State now face threats, violence, and persecution from the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed group fighting the Myanmar military. The AA has now seized control of almost all of Rakhine State, including all the townships along the border with Bangladesh, with the notable exceptions of the capital, Sittwe, and the port city of Kyaukpyu. Like the Myanmar military, the AA has subjected Rohingya to forced conscription, arbitrary arrests, extortion, and targeted killings. In February 2024, BHRN documented how the AA used civilian areas, including in Buthidaung Township while conducting attacks against the Myanmar junta.10 The AA is also responsible for drone, mortar shelling, and other attacks against Rohingya in Maungdaw Township.11

Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh

Nearly one million Rohingya refugees who have been forcibly displaced by several waves of violence by the Myanmar military since 1978 remain in sprawling refugee camps in neighboring Bangladesh.12

Rohingya have fled persecution and atrocities in Myanmar over many decades, including in the 1970s, 1990s, and in 2012.13

The largest exodus was in 2016 and 2017. Following two coordinated attacks against security forces in Rakhine State by Rohingya militants, the ARSA, the Myanmar Army, police, and civilian perpetrators committed massacres and arson attacks against Rohingya men, women, and children in northern Rakhine State, forcing hundreds of thousands of Rohingya into Bangladesh.14

At the time of writing, more than one million Rohingya remain confined to refugee camps in Bangladesh, where they are denied the ability to move freely, to pursue formal education and employment opportunities, or to form organisations and gather as civil society actors .

Governance at the camp level and sub-camp level is run by the “ majhi system ” which was established by the Bangladesh Army as an emergency response arrangement. Majhi’s were appointed by the Bangladesh authorities to answer directly to the Camp-in-Charge (CiC), a Bangladesh civil servant. The Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, an official in the Bangladeshi Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief is in charge of overseeing all camp management and the humanitarian response.15

The system was established to identify the immediate survival needs of refugees in the camps and to link them to emergency assistance from various providers. However, the majhi system was not established with the participation of the Rohingya refugees. Majhis are almost exclusively men, and the appointed majhis do not represent the diversity of the Rohingya refugee population in the camps. WHRDs interviewed by BHRN expressed a lack of space for meaningful participation of women within the majhi system, limiting their ability to advocate for their rights.16

Despite this system being envisioned as a temporary arrangement, it persists today, with no indication from the interim government that reforms will be undertaken.

Civil Society Space in the Refugee Camps

Since 2017, many Rohingya refugees who fled attacks in Myanmar have started a vast civil society network in the camps in Bangladesh, including women’s groups. Instead of working with the Rohingya-led organisations and networks, the Bangladesh authorities since 2019 have led a crackdown on civic space in the refugee camps.

On 25 August 2019, an estimated 200,000 refugees gathered for Rohingya Genocide Remembrance Day in Bangladesh to mark two years since they were forced to flee the genocide in Myanmar. Despite the peaceful demonstration calling for Rohingya citizenship and justice in Myanmar, the Bangladesh authorities intimidated and questioned the protest organisers in the wake of the event.17

A month after the protest, the authorities shut down the office of the Rohingya-led civil society organisation the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights. United Nations experts “ expressed serious concerns about tight new restrictions and an increased military presence at Rohingya refugee camps following [the] massive ‘ Genocide Day ’ protest... ”18

Furthermore, on September 9, 2019, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission directed all telecommunication operators to shut down 3G and 4G services in the camps.19 Later in November 2019, Bangladesh authorities began building barbed- wire fencing around the refugee camps.20 At the time of writing nearly the whole refugee camp has been fenced in.

While the internet shutdown was lifted in 2020, the Bangladesh government has implemented numerous policies which have constrained the ability of Rohingya refugees to pursue healthcare, education, and livelihood opportunities, and have restricted the rights of Rohingya to assemble and speak freely in the camps.21 Rohingya-led civil society organisations and volunteers attempting to provide the aforementioned services in the camps are met with threats, harassment, and sometimes violence from Bangladesh authorities and from Rohingya militant and criminal groups in the camps.

The crackdown on Rohingya civil society escalated further in September 2021, when armed men assassinated prominent Rohingya human rights defender Mohib Ullah in Kutupalong camp.22 His killing sent shockwaves through the Rohingya activist community, leading to increased fear and self-censorship among civil society leaders. Since his assassination, Bangladesh authorities have arrested and detained several Rohingya activists, further limiting civic space in the camps.

Under the former Prime Minister Sheikh government, Bangladesh authorities maintained tight control over Rohingya civil society, restricting protests, shutting down organizations, and arresting activists.23 Since August 2024, the interim government has not reversed these policies, and WHRDs and other activists remain at risk of harassment, surveillance, and intimidation.24

Following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 and the establishment of the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, some observers anticipated potential shifts in policy toward Rohingya refugees. However, BHRN’s research indicates that the restrictive policies of the previous government remain largely unchanged. Rohingya refugees continue to face severe restrictions on movement, education, and livelihoods, while WHRDs and other activists remain at risk of harassment, surveillance, and intimidation from Bangladeshi authorities. Reports from WHRDs interviewed by BHRN suggest that security forces under the interim government have continued suppressing Rohingya-led activism, obstructing efforts by civil society actors to organize and advocate for their rights.

Rohingya Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRDs)

This report focuses on Rohingya WHRDs in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh, and the restrictions they face from Bangladesh authorities as well as abuses from Rohingya armed and criminal groups.

There is no specific definition of who is or can be a human rights defender. “Human rights defender” is a broad term used to describe “people who, individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights in a peaceful manner.”25 For the purpose of this report, Rohingya WHRDs are Rohingya women working to promote and protect the human rights of the Rohingya, including the promotion of women's rights and rights related to gender equality. WHRDs include individuals “who may not self -identify as human rights defenders” but are engaging in work that promotes and protects the human rights of the Rohingya such as teachers, poets, and humanitarian actors.26

Rohingya women in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar

3Methodology

The report is based on 29 interviews with Rohingya WHRDs in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh, between August 2023 and November 2024.

Everyone interviewed for this report gave free, prior, and informed consent to be interviewed and for their testimony to be publicised. No one interviewed for this report received compensation, and all were informed of the purpose of the interview, its voluntary nature, and how the information might be used. BHRN reimbursed modest travel costs for some Rohingya WHRDs to meet in secure locations outside the refugee camps.

4Human Rights Violations

This chapter outlines how the Government of Bangladesh and Rohingya militant and criminal groups in Cox’s Bazar are restricting Rohingya WHRDs and abusing them. The violations reported by WHRDs include restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and gender-based violence, including sexual harassment and threats in person and in online spaces.

Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly27

For decades, the Rohingya have been subjected to persecution and discrimination in Myanmar. More than seven years after hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled the Myanmar military’s genocidal campaign, they continue to suffer in Bangladesh, where they face severe restrictions and are prevented from advocating for their rights. Rohingya refugees, particularly women, have limited opportunities to engage in decision-making processes that affect their lives and to publicly speak about the human rights situation in the camps without the risk of reprisals.

The rights to freedom of expression and assembly are enshrined in articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is recognized as customary international law. These rights are also protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Bangladesh has ratified. Under the ICCPR, any limitations on these rights must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate to that aim. The rights enshrined in the ICCPR apply to all persons within a state’s territory, regardless of nationality or legal status, including refugees.28

BHRN’s interviews with WHRDs demonstrate that Bangladesh authorities have continued to violate these fundamental rights under both the former Sheikh Hasina administration and the current interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. Since the interim government assumed power, WHRDs report facing the same restrictions on their activism and public expression as they did before.

One Rohingya WHRD told BHRN:

Under the interim government, the situation for freedom of expression for Rohingya women and women’s organizations has remained largely unchanged. Restrictions on free speech continue to limit our ability to advocate for rights without fear of reprisals. Rohingya women still face challenges when addressing issues like gender-based violence, repatriation, and the torture inflicted by the APBN [The Armed Police Battalion].29

Another WHRD confirmed that the crackdown on Rohingya civil society organizations remains unchanged:

Rohingya civil society organizations are still prohibited from organizing community discussions on their struggles or holding human rights workshops within the camps. Due to these restrictions, women’s organizations must carry out their activities discreetly within shelters, limiting their reach and preventing them from serving the entire block or camp.30

A WHRD interviewed by BHRN further emphasized that intimidation has persisted:

Since August 2024, we, as women’s rights defenders and camp -based organizations, have continued to face intimidation similar to what we experienced under the previous government.31

Another WHRD stated, “ Everywhere women are being restricted and we are not allowed to do activities like men.”32

BHRN found that restrictions on WHRDs have persisted under both the Sheikh Hasina administration and the interim government. One WHRD described the many barriers to organizing even small gatherings:

We face many challenges when organizing meetings and events, especially since the interim government came to power. Also, shortage of funds. One of the biggest problems is security and lack of funds. Sometimes the camps are under strict control, and the police stop people from moving between camps or even entering them.33

Another Rohingya WHRD described the consequences of speaking out against powerful actors:

We couldn't speak up against the government of Bangladesh, armed groups and religious boundaries before. If anyone speaks up against the government, she or he will be arrested by accusing something of a serious crime that the person has never committed. If we speak up against the armed groups, we will be beaten, abducted, or even killed. So, we do not speak against the armed groups and the Bangladesh government openly or publicly. After changing the government [in August 2024], I think the situation will be the same.34

WHRDs also reported facing intensified surveillance and intimidation from camp authorities:

The camp authorities, including APBN [The Armed Police Battalion], monitor activities through sources assigned by the CiC [Camp-in-Charge] on a block-by- block basis. The Majhis are pressured by authorities to report any observed activities or movements within their blocks. This practice has created significant obstacles for our women- led organization and for women’s rights defenders trying to organize events. In some cases, the camp-based Majhis have threatened us for ransom, and if we do not comply, they report our activities to the CiC, leading to potential action against us.35

In addition to restrictions imposed by Bangladeshi authorities, WHRDs described an increased risk of online reprisals for speaking out:

It is not safe to criticize the Bangladesh government online. Since the interim government came to power, speaking out against their policies can lead to threats, harassment, or punishment. If I say something critical, it can harm me, my family, or my community. Many refugees fear being targeted or facing more restrictions. So, even when we see injustice, we must be very careful about what we say.36

WHRDs also shared with BHRN how they are restricted from participating in meetings, events, and other activities as well as essential meetings organised by the Bangladesh authorities to influence decision-making. A Rohingya WHRD spoke about how women are restricted from attending or speaking during important meetings in the camps, saying: “[W] e are not given any opportunities to speak. If there are any important meetings in the camps or delegation visits, we are not allowed to meet with the representatives or to speak up .”37

This issue was raised by multiple WHRDs, particularly concerning delegation visits and consultation meetings related to the repatriation process. A WHRD described how she was restricted by the Camp-in-Charge and police from sharing her opinion during a ‘consultation’ meeting with a Myanmar junta delegation held in May 2023. She said:

There was a Myanmar delegation team that came to Bangladesh in relation to the repatriation process. There was a consultation meeting with the Rohingya. Some women were asked to join. The Bangladeshi authorities told the women that they were not allowed to speak during the meeting. They told the women to sit in silence and listen. It was the CiC [Camp-in-Charge] and different departments from the police [Special Force/Detective Branch] that told us not to raise any issues we were facing in the camps.38

Another Rohingya WHRD who attended the same meeting told BHRN that she was blocked by the CiC from sharing vital information she received during the meeting with her community. She explained:

I wanted to have a public information session for a wide range of [Rohingya] people, especially women. I discussed with the CiC that we wanted to hold a session so people know their rights and that we should not go back [to Myanmar] without dignity or our rights, but permission wasn’t granted [by the C iC].39

WHRDs also reported systematic exclusion from meetings organised by the CiC. When meetings are held, often only the male majhis are invited to participate.40 A WHRD described the lack of representation in these meetings saying, “ During the CiC monthly office meetings, very few women are invited to attend. Even though they are invited to attend, they are not permitted to speak. Only the men are given the floor to speak, and the women are ignored. ”41

Another WHRD, confirmed:

In CiC meetings, even though women are invited, they are not allowed to speak freely in these meetings. No one asks for women’s opinions before making policies or taking decisions in the camps. The CiC and other organisations operating in the camps don’t give us [women] any opportunity to say what we want. Our society doesn’t prioriti s e women’s voices.42

In addition to restrictions on freedom of expression, WHRDs also face prohibitions on gathering with other Rohingya to raise awareness and protest against the abuses they are facing in the camps. One WHRD t old BHRN, “ The Bangladesh government restricts us from assembling. They prohibit us from speaking about our rights by restricting us from protesting. ”43

Other WHRDs interviewed by BHRN tried to assemble for the Rohingya Genocide Remembrance Day events in 2023 but were restricted by the Bangladesh authorities. Every 25 August, Rohingya observe “Genocide Remembrance Day”, the anniversary of the violent attacks led by the Myanmar military against them in 2017. Many Rohingya women said it was harder for women to gather compared to men.44

One WHRD shared how her women-led civil society organisation tried to hold an event for Genocide Remembrance Day but was prevented from doing so. She said:

On 25 August 2023 [for Genocide Remembrance Day], the [Rohingya] men held a big demonstration, but we were not allowed to. … Women were prohibited from joining in the demonstration with men by the CiC. There was an announcement on 24 August through hand microphones by the CiC that women should not go out on 25 August.45

Instead, many women’s groups had to hold their events in secret. “ We had to do our own protest [elsewhere in the camp] privately, and we took photos and posted them online .”46

Another Rohingya WHRD whom BHRN spoke with also faced restrictions that prevented her from participating in the Genocide Remembrance Day events, saying:

It is more difficult for women to assemble than men. For example, for the Genocide Remembrance Day [in August 2023], we requested permission, but it was denied. … The CiC told us that if we tried to participate, we would face issues. They said we could be targeted or killed or face issues by armed groups. They also said we were not an officially registered organisation.47

In addition to being restricted from participating in public events, WHRDs were also prevented from organising their own private gatherings. One WHRD described to BHRN how she was stopped by the CiC while conducting an awareness session on human rights. In December 2022, she was stopped and followed by CiC for doing work with a Rohingya organisation that was unregistered. She said:

We face challenges as we are not a registered organisation and have no ID cards from [an international humanitarian] organisation. … Once we were running an awareness raising session and we were stopped by the CiC volunteers and told that we had to go with them to the CiC office or we would be in trouble. They took our photographs and made us go with them to meet the CiC authorities.48

Finally, Rohingya WHRDs who spoke to BHRN also shared that in addition to the government-imposed restrictions on their ability to speak freely and assemble, they also face violent threats from ARSA which hinders them from freely expressing themselves. A Rohingya WHRD told BHRN, “ If women speak up, they face death threats from ARSA and other groups. ”49

Another WHRD explained the dangers women in the camps face from ARSA when they exercise their rights to freedom of expression:

There are so many barriers to freedom of expression and freedom of speech for women. If we try to express what we think freely, we will be targeted and killed by the ARSA group. … We really want to do advocacy and raise our voice about the human rights violations in the camps. We are seeing so many things happening in front of us, but we cannot share because it will put our lives in danger. If I get a safe space to share, I also have to worry about the safety of my family members in the camps so I cannot express everything. If I do, they will be targeted.50

After the assassination of prominent human rights defender Mohib Ullah, the woman was threatened by ARSA for posting a message about Mohib Ullah on Meta’s Facebook.51 She said:

I posted about Mohib Ullah on social media, they assumed I was connected [to him]. … After the Mohib Ullah murder in [September 2021], ARSA visited my house and searched my house. They told me that I should not be going outside of my house, or they would kill me. They told me not to share anything on social media related to Mohib Ullah or to speak about it with anyone or I would disappear.52

Rohingya women in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar

Restrictions on Assembly and Expression Related to Cooperation with International Justice Mechanisms

Over the last several years many international justice mechanisms including the International Criminal Court (ICC),53 Gambia’s team working on the case at International Court of Justice (ICJ),54 members of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM),55 and others have visited the refugee camps in southern Bangladesh to meet with survivors and witnesses and collect evidence of crimes by the Myanmar military. Most recently, the ICC in 2024, Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan said his office is seeking an arrest warrant for Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing.56

BHRN documented how Rohingya WHRDs who met with the various international accountability delegations over the years faced restrictions on their freedom of expression by the Bangladesh authorities who told WHRDs to not speak about the human rights problems they are facing in Bangladesh.57 WHRDs also reported to BHRN that they were questioned, harassed, and threatened by the Bangladesh authorities and ARSA following their meetings.

For example, a Rohingya WHRD and leader of a civil society organisation in the camps told BHRN how she met with the Gambia’s team as part of the ICJ delegation's visit to the refugee camps. Bangladesh CiC authorities took away the women’s mobile phone and were told by CiC officials not to speak about the human rights situation in the camps. One Rohingya WHRD in attendance shared her experience:

There was also a team from the Gambia . … We were invited to meet them as women community leaders to share our situation in the camp. The CiC forcibly took away our mobile phones, our bags, everything. The situation is similar to what happened to us in Myanmar. They restricted us from speaking about the camp situation. I was told by the CiC not to share our situation in the camp. There were police special forces standing next to us the whole time making sure that we did not speak [about the abuses in the camps].58

In another incident, the same woman told BHRN about being questioned by Bangladesh authorities for her cooperation with ICC during a delegation visit they made [date withheld for security].59 She told BHRN:

[T]he ICC delegation came to Bangladesh and wanted to meet with us and the women we support. I helped them to meet our women and for that I faced numerous challenges with the authorities. They called me and investigated me and called my house over and over. I couldn’t leave my house for three days [out of fear]. DGFI [Directorate General of Forces Intelligence], NSI [National Security Intelligence], Detective Branch, and CiC [Camp-in-Charge] were calling me and questioning me about how I knew the ICC, what I shared with them, and why I was speaking to them. They also came to my house to question [me]. There was a photo posted on social media with me and the ICC delegation and they asked why I met [them], where I met with the ICC, what I shared etc.60

Another Rohingya WHRD told BHRN about a similar pattern of questioning by Bangladesh security forces after she spoke to the Gambia delegation working on the ICJ case. She said:

After I met with the Gambia, I received calls from the Bangladeshi Special Forces. They asked me several times to give them more details – what I said to the Gambia. They also asked for photos from the meeting. … The CiC called my family and asked for the names of the five women who met with the Gambia team. There were 20 people who met with the Gambia delegation, but the CiC called and asked for at least five names of people who attended so they could investigate [us].61

She continued: “Someone posted a video on social media about the Gambia meeting and then we faced issues. I know the other women who went. … [The] Detective Branch also followed the other women and questioned them. We were investigated for two days continuously.”62

Another Rohingya WHRD told BHRN that her son and her were facing threats for their work with the ICC case. She said:

As I was involved in the ICC case and my son was supporting the community on the ICC case as a witness, he is receiving continuous threats and can no longer stay at his home. My son is in danger now from ARSA. My other son’s home was looted by ARSA a few days back because I am involved in justice work. Both of my sons are receiving threats.63

“ARSA is calling me and demanding huge amounts of money from me. They are saying that because I am [engaging with the] court . … that I must be receiving huge amounts of money. Give us money or we will kidnap you and your son,” she explained.64

The WHRD told BHRN that she reported the incident to an international human rights organisation she was working with, but the group allegedly didn’t respond.65

Another Rohingya WHRD involved with the ICC case also received threats from ARSA for her engagement with the accountability mechanism:

I have received several threats from ARSA saying do not be involved with the ICC or any other international justice mechanisms or they would kill me. … They [ARSA] came to my house and said, “We will kill you if you continue to work on this case [the ICC] and if you raise your voice.” … I am really afraid of that, but I want to continue to support the women I work with. They are rape survivors like me, and I want to continue to fight for justice. Even though I cannot express it publicly and seek justice openly, I still receive death threats.

She shared with BHRN the mental trauma that the threats from ARSA have caused, saying: “After this [receiving death threats from ARSA], I tried to kill myself. I thought to myself, why should women have to live in this type of world. We have no rights and no justice here. We have no security.”66

Gender-Based Violence

Almost all Rohingya women human rights defenders (WHRD) interviewed by BHRN are either survivors of, or witnesses to, gender-based violence (GBV) in Myanmar. As refugees in Bangladesh, these women continue to face ongoing insecurity and gender- based violence.

As a state party to CEDAW, Bangladesh is obligated to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women, to protect women against gender-based violence, and advance gender equality.67

The provisions of CEDAW apply to all women in Bangladesh regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or legal status, including refugees. CEDAW also requires state parties to implement safeguards against sexual and gender-related violence (SGBV) in refugee settings and to provide remedies for such violations.68

Despite these commitments, nearly all WHRDs interviewed by BHRN experienced at least one form of GBV while in Bangladesh. This includes physical violence, sexual harassment, and hate speech – both in person and online, including on Meta-owned platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp, and others.

A significant majority of survivors of GBV reported being targeted for working outside their homes and for speaking out on human rights issues in the camps. Many Rohingya WHRDs cited ARSA as one of the main perpetrators of violence against women, including harassment, threats, assault, and abductions.

One Rohingya WHRD told BHRN that since August 2024, the situation in the camps has remained unsafe for women despite the transition to the Muhammad Yunus interim government. She highlighted the increase in violence by criminal and militant groups in the camps, stating:

Since August 2024, we have noticed significant changes in how authorities and other groups attempt to interfere with our work. The gangs [Rohingya criminal groups] in the camps have grown more powerful, effectively taking control over many aspects of camp life. Unfortunately, the police, Camp-in-Charge, and other security forces appear to be turning a blind eye to their activities, allowing these groups to operate freely. As a result, we are often stopped and threatened by these gangs while trying to carry out our work.69

The same WHRD emphasized that women who speak out about the insecurity in the camps face direct retaliation from both armed groups and police forces:

There have been no improvements in the situation for Rohingya women in the camps since the interim government took power [in August 2024]. In fact, women are now facing even greater risks. If a woman speaks out about gangs’ behavior or security issues, she often becomes a target. Both the gangs and ABPN police retaliate against her and threaten her family. The camps are largely controlled by gangs in collaboration with ABPN police, who extort money from women families who are involved in CSOs, particularly those who are already victims from several CSOs.70

A WHRD explained to BHRN, “ARSA is the main perpetrator [of human rights violations against women in Bangladesh]. They are targeting, raping, and extorting women. Women are really traumatis ed and scared.”71

WHRDs expressed widespread fear for their physical safety when leaving their homes to work. One WHRD told BHRN, “ I feel really afraid when I walk to work [because of the harassment from armed groups]. My female colleagues also feel afraid as well. ”72

A few days before her interview with BHRN, she was verbally harassed and threatened by ARSA members for her work. She recounted:

ARSA was verbally harassing me by saying that I should be kidnapped and tortured and maybe then I will learn my lesson [to not work outside of the home]. I try to tell them that I have to work to fix my shelter and to live, but it is not easy. If they found out that I was talking about the crimes they [ARSA] commit, they would set fire to my home or kill me.73

In another incident, a WHRD who teaches children and youth, described being abducted and threatened by ARSA multiple times between 2019 and 2023. Out of fear of reprisal, she chose not to report the incidents to the police:

[T]hey [ARSA] used to come to my house to threaten me. … At one period they were coming to my home two to three times a day to shout at me. I reported it to UNHCR, and they told me that I had to make a case against ARSA [to the police], but I was too afraid to report it because I would have to speak to the police. If ARSA found out, they would kill me. I was too afraid to report it.74

Another Rohingya WHRD spoke about being abducted by ARSA in 2020. where she was beaten, threatened, and forced to sign a document stating she would not report the incident to Bangladeshi authorities or continue her work with women. She told BHRN:

In 2020, I was kidnapped by them [ARSA] from my home. Another girl that I worked with was also taken [with me]. They [ARSA] took us from our homes. They were investigating what we were doing and asked if we had any funding to work for women. They threatened us and then made us promise on the Quran that we would not report to anyone about the kidnapping and threats. We could not approach any authorities for help. … [ARSA members] hit us with a stick.75

The statement she was forced to sign explicitly stated that she would not teach women or girls . She explained, “They [ARSA] made us sign a statement that we would not continue our work or report them [to the authorities]. … We explained that we were only trying to teach women how to write and sign their signature.”76

Speaking about the same incident, another Rohingya WHRD with the same organisation was also abducted. She told BHRN, “When I didn’t stop running my education activities, I was taken [by ARSA]. … [After making educational videos in the Rohingya language] I received threats by phone and then kidnapped. We were held for four to five hours. ”77

She continued: “They [ARSA] took us from our homes around 6:00 p.m. and put us in a big room and tortured us. They beat me with a stick. I was shouting at them, ‘W hy are you torturing me without any reason? ’”78

One of the WHRD told BHRN:

I said [to the ARSA men] that we were just trying to give kids and women a basic education. They told me that if our organisation has any funding, we have to hand it over to them. If there is any chance for us to work, we have to work through them and follow their instructions. If we initiate any project, we have to inform ARSA and get their permission. They made us promise on the Quran that we will not share with anyone what happened to us [the kidnapping and torture].79

She told BHRN how she is now being monitored by ARSA and their supporters: “I was followed by ARSA and couldn’t do my work.”80

Another Rohingya WHRD told BHRN about multiple incidents of threats from ARSA. She said: “ Every week I am being followed by ARSA. This morning, I was stopped and questioned by ARSA on my way. … They often visit my house and threaten me. ”81

She further explained that ARSA closely monitors her online activities:

If I go to any meeting, they question me about who I met with and what kind of things I am sharing. If ARSA sees any online activity from me [about attending meetings or events], they visit my house and interrogate me about what I shared during the meeting. Did I share anything bad about us [ARSA]. I cannot speak up anywhere about anything.82

WHRDs emphasized that single women, widows, or women without male family members were particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment by ARSA.

One WHRD described the persistent harassment she faced for years after her husband’s death in 2018:

At the beginning, when my husband passed away, and I was a single woman in my house, I faced sexual harassment, and men [from ARSA] kept making sexual advances. They came to my home at night and threatened me. They said if I do not find a new relationship, then I will face more violence. … ARSA came to me many times and made sexual advances. I had to flee many times from my own shelter to go to my brother’s shelter or other family members. I cannot move around freely. I have been caught by them many times. I couldn’t share freely with anyone what happened to me because I was ashamed.83

She described the severe psychological toll of these experiences, saying, “I feel like I should die, like I should kill myself because of this treatment and ongoing harassment. I don’t feel safe at my shelter. Every time I go out, I am afraid.”84

She explained that her experience of shame is common among other women who have been targeted with sexual violence by ARSA, saying, “ After facing all of this sexual harassment and being raped, women feel they can’t show their face to their community anymore. Sometimes, they commit suicide. ”85

When WHRDs were asked what avenues for recourse they had for the violence they were facing in the camps, all women replied that there were no safe spaces available for women to share or report what they had experienced. For example, one WHRD told BHRN in 2024:

There is no protection for us although millions of US dollars are being spent in the name of protection. If a person needs protection, the person is taken to the transit center, located in Kutupalong. The transit is not very different from a prison, and we need to spend our lives there like prisoners. … There is no safe place for us to live or stay. And there's no protection for us in the camp as long as the armed groups are present in the camps. We were vulnerable.86

One woman explained to BHRN in 2023 , “ There is no security for us in the camp. There is no place where we can go and share our trauma and the experiences that we are facing. We are facing numerous challenges that we cannot explain to anyone. There is nowhere we can go. ”87

Another avenue for Rohingya is the UNHCR hotline as a way to report protection concerns. However, many Rohingya WHRD told BHRN that the hotline was unresponsive to their needs: “Even UNHCR hotline numbers are not responsive.”88 She continued: “We called many times to that number to help a woman headed family with serious injured of a bullet who have fled recently from Myanmar, but our calls were not responded.”89

Online Gender-Based Violence90

Due to the restrictions on civil society space and the protections concerns WHRDs face in the camps, many rely on online platforms to exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and expression. However, many reported facing online gender-based violence (OGBV) in the form of sexist and misogynistic language, hate speech, and targeted threats, which hindered their ability to express themselves freely and safely participate in advocacy.

Some instances of this speech can be categorized as "sexist hate speech" because they not only demean Rohingya identity or include threats of violence but also target women specifically for their gender.91 In several cases, the lines between online and offline gender-based violence were blurred, with digital harassment leading to stalking, physical violence, and further marginalization of WHRDs within their own communities.

While “sexist speech” and “sexist hate speech” are not specifically listed within CEDAW, to which Bangladesh is a state party, the CEDAW Committee recognizes them as a form of gender-based violence CEDAW General Recommendation 19 defines gender-based violence as “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental, or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. ”92

CEDAW General Recommendation 35 further expands the definition of GBV established under updated General Recommendation 19, article 6 by declaring that:

[G]ender-based violence against women, whether committed by States, intergovernmental organizations or non-State actors, including private persons and armed groups, remains pervasive in all countries, with high levels of impunity. It manifests itself on a continuum of multiple, interrelated and recurring forms, in a range of settings, from private to public, including technology-mediated settings and in the contemporary globalized world it transcends national boundaries.93

Article 20 continues by saying:

Gender-based violence against women occurs in all spaces and spheres of human interaction, whether public or private. … and their redefinition through technology- mediated environments, such as contemporary forms of violence occurring in the Internet and digital spaces.94

The types of OGBV faced by Rohingya WHRDs are diverse and warrant further investigation. WHRDs interviewed by BHRN reported experiencing:

  • Gendered hate speech and sexist and misogynist attacks
  • Surveillance, monitoring, cyberstalking
  • Manipulation or alteration of information and photographs with an intent to harm or defame them
  • Doxing and identity theft
  • Direct threats against WHRDs and their families Several WHRDs reported that their online activities were being monitored by ARSA, leading to various forms of OGBV and, in some cases, to direct attacks against WHRDs and their families.

One WHRD described how ARSA monitors her posts and intimidates her:

“If ARSA sees any online activity from me [about attending meetings or events], they visit my house and interrogate me about what I shared during the meeting, did I share anything bad about us [ARSA]. I cannot speak up anywhere about anything.”95

Another WHRD described how she was stalked, photographed, and had private photos disseminated online without her consent by individuals she believes are ARSA members:

I have been facing social harassment and abuse on social media because I am working as a teacher. Some of my private photos like photos of me that were published online on various social media pages. One photo was of me sleeping in bed at home. Another one was of me teaching at my home. I joined a reading program in my community and photos from me attending this were leaked and posted online. This [the online abuse] started about five months ago, but they [ARSA] have been making posts about consistently since then.96

She also said fake accounts were created in her name:

They [ARSA] also created a fake account using pictures of me and my family. They found photos of my husband and my sister and posted them on the fake account. Since my photos started to be shared online, my neighbors started treating me badly. They said that I don’t h ave a good character. I am also facing issues now with my husband because of this.97

She explained that different social media accounts are now messaging her husband on Facebook and threatening the family. She told BHRN, “ They [the social media users] are saying he shouldn’t let his wife work outside of the home and that he should be prepared to die for his actions.”98

She told BHRN she believed ARSA members were targeting her because of her work, saying: “ Because we are working outside of the house and attending meetings and meeting with different delegations, they [ARSA] think we are passing information about their activities in the camps to outside people.”99

In another case, a WHRD shared how she was targeted after refusing sexual advances from an ARSA member. She described how the harassment began:

I was followed by a man [from ARSA] who solicited me for sex. I told him no. He tried to connect with me through one of my friends. She gave him my number and after that I have faced harassment and threats online and by phone. The man told me if I don’t ac cept [his sexual advances] that he will kill me or hand me over to ARSA, which he is a part of. He has also sent threatening voice messages to my mother that he will kidnap and rape me if I don’t marry him and then no one will want me. She later discovered that the same man had stolen her private photos from her phone, digitally altered them, and shared them online without her consent:

[He] took my phone from me, went through my private photographs, and shared my photos all over social media. He took some photos and digitally edited my body and also took my face and added it to the bodies of other women [wearing sexy clothing] and uploaded these photos on social media. It spread all over the camps and my community started to see me in a negative light and started to make negative comments about me.100

After her private photos were leaked online, her family physically abused and ostracized her:

After the sexual harassment [from the ARSA man], even my family rejected me. They blamed me for what happened. People showed my brother the photos and videos online and he beat me several times. My father also beat me. My family was faced negative comments from the community because of the online posts about me. I was going through a lot and didn’t get support from anyone. I stopped eating when this happened.101

In another case, a WHRD was kidnapped from ARSA after posting an informational video online to raise awareness about the COVID situation in the camps. She told BHRN:

In 2021 during the COVID situation, I made a video about safety measures people could take to prevent getting COVID in the camps. Then I received threats by phone and then kidnapped. We were held for 4-5 hours. They took us from our homes around 6 p.m. and put us in a big room and tortured us. They beat me with a stick. I was shouting at them, “why are you torturing me without any reason? The man beating me said, “People who shout like you [speak up online as a woman] get killed”.102

After continuing to post online, her younger brother was also abducted and beaten by ARSA:

My younger brother who was only 16 years old was abducted by ARSA and beaten very badly. When he was taken, they took his phone so we couldn’t communicate with him for four days. … ARSA made us pay 20,000 Taka [around 180 USD] to release him. … We were told by ARSA [by phone] that if we told anyone what happened that they would murder my little brother.103

Besides being targeted by ARSA, WHRDs also described facing gendered vitriol from Rohingya and Bangladeshi men online, often in the form of sexist abuse and hate speech on Facebook and other social media platforms.

One WHRD described the harassment she faced after posting about the human rights situation of women in the camps:

I make videos which are posted on social media. I have to post my videos on social media. I didn’t face any physical challenges physically but faced mental torture from verbal harassment … There were comments from the Bangladeshi community and others that I didn’t know. They abused me verbally and wrote negative things about me like:

  • “You are a Rohingya. Why are you speaking out in our country? You should stop making videos related to your situation. You have no right to speak.”
  • “You’re a girl , so you should be at home in the kitchen.”
  • “Why would you uncover [expose] your face [as a woman] .”104

Other WHRDs shared similar stories of receiving abusive comments online for posting videos in relation to their work. When asked to describe her online abuse, a WHRD told BHRN, “People [online] have said things to me like ‘Oh, you can be a porn star for making videos’ and ‘How dare you make videos, you are Rohingya.”105

Another WHRD shared her experience of being targeted for making posts online in December 2022 in relation to her work:

I am being bullied on social media for being exposed and working online. I have received physical threats and sexual harassment. … They told me that since I am a Muslim woman, I should not go outside of the house and do these sorts of activities in my community. The other women were being empowered by me and the men in my community did not like that. They said I was from the Rohingya community, so I should be more conservative.106

Another Rohingya WHRD explained general online negative comments, saying: “ I received a lot of negative comments from local people and armed group members, so after seeing those things [I] felt so hurt. … I have a bunch of threaten[ing] messages from WhatsApp, Facebook, etc.”107

Following experiences of OGBV, many WHRDs reported psychological harm, including shame, humiliation, and self-censorship.

One WHRD explained that she did not feel safe sharing the online sexual harassment and bullying she faced with anyone in her community out of concern for her “ dignity and being shamed by [her] community.”108

This fear of being shamed for being targeted with sexual harassment was described by another WHRD who explained, “When things like this happen [sexual harassment in person and online], it makes it harder for women to get married as men won’t accept us.”109

As a result, many WHRDs practice self-censorship - using pseudonyms online or other methods to hide their identity, reduced engagement or altered engagement on social media, and increased risk evaluation before posting on social media.

One WHRD told BHRN she doesn't feel safe doing human rights work after the online abuse she faced. She now hides her face in any public advocacy or online space.110

Another WHRD shared how she uses a pseudonym to protect herself online : “I cannot even use my real name on social media because I face issues. I have to use a different name, a Burmese name to save myself. ”111

When asked how they responded in the wake of their abuse, WHRDs only noted self- censorship as a means to protect themselves from further harm. None of the WHRDs pursued any avenues of recourse as they did not feel there were any safe avenues available to them in Bangladesh that would not result in further targeting. WHRDs also shared that they had limited understanding of how to report abusive behavior online via social media platforms or other measures they could take to protect themselves online.

5Recommendations

1The Government of Bangladesh

  • Ensure that Rohingya, particularly WHRDs, can effectively exercise their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, including the right to establish, join, and lead refugee-led organisations, associations, or other groups.
  • Guarantee Rohingya human rights defenders, particularly women, safe and unhindered access to the United Nations, human rights groups, journalists, and justice and accountability mechanisms, including the ICC, ICJ, and IIMM.
  • Publicly condemn hate speech, disinformation, stereotyping, and negative narratives about Rohingya refugees, particularly Rohingya WHRDs, that incite hate or intolerance, and take measures to prevent their spread.
  • Protect Rohingya WHRDs from online gender-based violence by ensuring that online threats, harassment, and intimidation are investigated, and that perpetrators are held accountable.
  • Ensure that Rohingya women survivors of violence and harassment have access to health and social services, legal assistance, and effective remedies to guarantee their safety, protection, and recovery.
  • Ensure that Rohingya WHRDs can report gender-based violence, harassment, and human rights violations to government authorities without fear of reprisals. Ensure that such violations are impartially, promptly, and fully investigated and that perpetrators are prosecuted and punished in accordance with fair trial standards.
  • Urgently address the security situation and protection concerns in the refugee camps. Investigate and apprehend criminal and militant groups committing crimes through enhanced coordination among Bangladeshi law enforcement, aid groups, United Nations, and refugees themselves.
  • Work with humanitarian partners and the United Nations to expand protective spaces, including safe houses, for Rohingya refugees and their families, particularly women, who are facing imminent security threats from Rohingya militant and criminal groups.
  • Work with governments worldwide and the United Nations to expand third-country resettlement programs for Rohingya refugees, particularly WHRDs who are at heightened risk of violence.

2United Nations agencies

  • Collaborate with the Bangladesh government to improve and expand the network of protective spaces, including safe houses for Rohingya WHRDs who are facing imminent security threats from Rohingya militant and criminal groups.
  • Work with the Bangladesh government to reform the camp governance system, ensuring Rohingya-led representation in decision-making bodies and leadership roles. The election process for camp leadership should reflect the gender and diversity composition of the Rohingya refugee population, with at least 50% representation of women.
  • Ensure that all programming and protection services meaningfully include Rohingya women’s organizations and WHRDs in decision -making processes related to security, advocacy, and access to justice.
  • Increase funding and technical support for Rohingya- led women’s organizations to strengthen their capacity to advocate for their rights and address human rights violations.

3Donor governments

  • Continue to support and fund the Rohingya humanitarian response.
  • Engage with the government of Bangladesh to raise concerns about the ongoing security threats faced by Rohingya WHRDs and ensure their protection.
  • Expand third-country resettlement programs for Rohingya refugees, prioritizing WHRDs who are at heightened risk due to their activism.
  • Support protection training, including digital security training and online safety programs tailored for Rohingya WHRDs, to mitigate the risks of online gender- based violence and ensure that WHRDs can safely advocate for human rights in physical and digital spaces.

4National Unity Government

  • Ensure the full and meaningful engagement of the Rohingya and other Muslim minorities to restore their equal rights, recognize their citizenship, and ensure their representation in all ongoing political processes, including in the NUG’s governance structures.
  • Appoint more women, including Rohingya women, into leadership positions within the NUG.
  • Coordinate with the Bangladesh government to promote and protect the rights of Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar and ensure their access to health, education, livelihoods, and protection support.
  • Issue public statements affirming the full citizenship rights of the Rohingya, and committing to inclusive policies that recognize the Rohingya as an indigenous ethnic group of Myanmar.

5Social media companies

  • Ensure timely and consistent application of their policies and any other rules regarding harassment and abusive content. These policies should be translated into Rohingya and Burmese languages.
  • Allocate sufficient resources to assess and respond promptly to threats, harassment, and other forms of online abuse targeting Rohingya WHRDs and other human rights defenders. This should include hiring and training Rohingya and Burmese-speaking staff to review reports of threats and harassment.
  • Strengthen partnerships with Rohingya civil society organizations, women’s rights groups, and human rights defenders to develop targeted solutions that prevent and respond to gender-based and racist harassment online.

Footnotes

  1. There are also small communities of Hindus and practitioners of Judaism, traditional Chinese religions, and animist religions. United States Department , “2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Burma,” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/burma/ . ↩
  2. Most Rohingya reside in the three townships called Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships. See “Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis,” BBC , 24 April 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 ↩
  3. According to MSF, there are approximately 2.8 million Rohingya people in the world today, and the overwhelming majority — an estimated 99% — are contained or marginalized by harmful policies that deny them basic human rights and self- determination. See , MSF, “Behind the Wire Impact of State of Containment and Exclusion S trategies on the Rohingya,” 2024, https://doctorswithoutborders-apac.org/en/behind-the-wire . ↩
  4. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar , U.N, September, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index#:~:text=The%20Independent%20International%20Fact%2DFinding%20Mission%20on%20Myanmar%20found%20pat terns,gravest%20crimes%20under%20international%20law .. ↩
  5. In June 2023, the National Unity Government has pledged to repeal the 1982 Citizenship Law, end the National Verification Card process, and revoke the 2015 Race and Religion Protection Laws, which have been used to discriminate against the Rohingya and other minority groups. ↩
  6. BHRN, “National Verification Cards - A Barrier to Rohingya Repatriation,” July 2019, https://bhrn.org.uk/report/1090-national-verification-cards-a-barrier-to-rohingya-repatriation-full-report.html . ↩
  7. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar , September, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index#:~:text=The%20Independent%20International%20Fact%2DFinding%20Mission%20on%20Myanmar%20found%20pa tterns,gravest%20crimes%20under%20international%20law .. ↩
  8. BHRN, “Nowhere to Run: Rohingya Trapped Between An Open Air Prison and Jail,” August 2020, https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/report/1128-nowhere-to-run-in-burma.html . ↩
  9. For more information about the coup in Myanmar see BHRN report, “Before Our Very Eyes: Myanmar’s Military Junta Commits Crimes Against Humanity While the International Community Fails to Act,” https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/report/1176-bhrn-releases-newest-report-documenting-crimes-against-humanity-committed-by-the-tatmadaw.html . ↩
  10. BHRN, “Arakan Army Must Stop Combat in Civilian Areas,” 3 February 2024, https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/press-release/1240-arakan-army-must-stop-combat-in-civilian-areas.html . ↩
  11. For example, a 22-year- old man from Pan Taw Pyin Village told BHRN, “Rohingya are targeted and bombarded where they can see many Rohingya [are gathered]. We didn’t see AA attack over the Rakhines' villages. Every day, in every hour, AA drone s attacked over Rohingya vill ages.” See BHRN, “Rohingya in Maungdaw Being Massacred While the World Looks Away,” 21 August 2024, https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/press-release/1263-rohingya-in-maungdaw-being-massacred-while-the-world-looks-away.html . ↩
  12. Amnesty International, “Bangladesh: Let Us Speak for Our Rights: Human Rights Situation of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” September 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/2884/2020/en/ . ↩
  13. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar , September, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index#:~:text=The%20Independent%20International%20Fact%2DFinding%20Mission%20on%20Myanmar%20found%20pat terns,gravest%20crimes%20under%20international%20law .. ↩
  14. Fortify Rights, “They Gave Them Long Swords: Preparations for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar,” July 2018, https://www.fortifyrights.org/mly-inv-rep-2018-07-19/ . ↩
  15. Act for Peace, “An Agenda for a Dignified and Sustainable Rohingya Refugee Response in Bangladesh,” 26 May 2021, https://www.actforpeace.org.au/app/uploads/2021/12/publications-report-agenda-for-dignified-sustainable-rohingya-refugee-response.pdf . ↩
  16. BHRN interviews with Rohingya WHRD , Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023 and 2024. ↩
  17. See for example, Human Rights Watch, “Bangladesh: Clampdown on Rohingya Refugees,” 7 September 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/07/bangladesh-clampdown-rohingya-refugees . ↩
  18. “Bangladesh: UN Experts Concerned by Crackdown at Rohingya Refugee C amps,” 16 September 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/09/bangladesh-un-experts-concerned-crackdown-rohingya-refugee-camps/ ↩
  19. “3G, 4G Services Restricted in Ukhia-Teknaf Until Further N otice,” Daily Star , 10 September 2019, https://www.thedailystar.net/rohingya-crisis/news/3g-4g-services-restricted-ukhia-teknaf-until-further-notice-1798249 . ↩
  20. “Bangladesh: Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Rohingya R efugees in Cox’s Bazar,” MSF , March 2021, https://www.msf.ie/article/bangladesh-between-rock-and-hard-place-rohingya-refugees-coxs-bazar . ↩
  21. Fortify Rights, “Universal Periodic Review: Bangladesh’s Record on Refugee Rights, 2018 - 2023,” November 2023, https://www.fortifyrights.org/bgd-inv-rep-2023-11-09/ . ↩
  22. “Mohib Ullah, 46, Dies; Documented Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya,” New York Times , 2 October 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/02/world/asia/mohib-ullah-dead.html . ↩
  23. BHRN interviews Rohingya WHRD, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2023 and 2024. ↩
  24. BHRN interviews Rohingya WHRD, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2024. ↩
  25. OHCHR, “About Human Rights D efenders,” https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-human-rights-defenders/about-human-rights-defenders#:~:text=%E2%80%9CHuman%20rights%20defender%E2%80%9D%20is%20a,rights%20in%20a%20peaceful%20man ner .. ↩
  26. OHCHR, "Who are Women Human Rights D efenders?” https://www.ohchr.org/en/women/women-human-rights-defenders#:~:text=It%20also%20includes%20any%20civil,humanitarian%20actors%2C%20etc . ↩
  27. BHRN interviews with 29 Rohingya WHRDs, Bangladesh 2023 and 2024. ↩
  28. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html . ↩
  29. BHRN interview #29, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2024. ↩
  30. BHRN interview #29, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2024. ↩
  31. BHRN interview #29, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2024. ↩
  32. BHRN interview #3, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  33. BHRN interview #26, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2024. ↩
  34. BHRN interview #28, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  35. BHRN interview #29, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2024. ↩
  36. BHRN interview #29, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  37. BHRN interview #3, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  38. BHRN interview #14, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. See also BHRN, “Bangladesh -Myanmar End Coercive Repatriation of Rohingya Refugees,” 31 October 2023, https://www.bhrn.org.uk/en/press-release/1229-bangladesh-myanmar-end-coercive-repatriation-of-rohingya-refugees.html . ↩
  39. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar , Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  40. BHRN interview #3, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  41. BHRN interview #10, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  42. BHRN interview #12, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  43. BHRN interview #12, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  44. BHRN interviews with Rohingya WHRD, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh , 2023 and 2024. ↩
  45. BHRN interview #3, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  46. BHRN interview #3, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  47. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  48. BHRN interview #7, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  49. BHRN interview #12, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  50. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  51. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  52. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  53. The International Criminal Court (ICC) opened a case concerning the crime against humanity of deportation and other crimes related to the mass expulsion of Rohingya in 2016 and 2017. ↩
  54. The Gambia filed the case against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in November 2019, alleging that the Myanmar military’s campaign against the Rohingya people violated the Genocide Convention. In January 2020, the ICJ unanimously indicated legally binding provisional measures of protection for the Rohingya people, requiring Myanmar to ensure that the military do not commit acts of genocide. ↩
  55. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) was established by the Human Rights Council in September 2018 and is mandated to collect evidence of the most serious international crimes and violations of international law and prepare files for criminal prosecution. ↩
  56. ICC, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Application for an arrest warrant in the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar,” 24 November 2024, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-application-arrest-warrant-situation-bangladesh . ↩
  57. See for example, BHRN interview #1 and #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  58. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  59. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. See also “ICC Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan KC Concludes Second Visit to Bangladesh,” 10 July 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-prosecutor-karim-khan-kc-concludes-second-visit-bangladesh-rohingya-must-not-be-forgotten . ↩
  60. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. The woman also explained to BHRN that during the ICC delegation ARSA committed killings in the camps. She said, “If there is any progress on the ICC case, ARSA makes a problem here in the camps. They kill someone or make a burning to divert attention. They want to prove that the Rohingya are not living in unity, and we are like criminals. ARSA are the agents of Myanmar. . . When the ICC delegation team came, ARSA killed Rohingya leaders in the [camps] . They made two incidents on that day.” ↩
  61. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  62. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  63. BHRN interview #5, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  64. BHRN interview #5, Cox’s Bazar , Bangladesh, 2023. Details of the Rohingya WHRD’s experience have been withheld in this report for security reasons. ↩
  65. BHRN interview #5, Cox’s Baza r, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  66. BHRN interview #4, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  67. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women , 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html ↩
  68. CEDAW Statement on the Anniversaries of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/StatementAnniversaries1951Convention pdf . ↩
  69. BHRN interview #26, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  70. BHRN interview #26 , Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  71. BHRN interview #4, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  72. BHRN interview #11, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  73. BHRN interview #11, Cox’s Bazar , Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  74. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  75. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  76. BHRN interview #1, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  77. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  78. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  79. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  80. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  81. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  82. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  83. BHRN interview #4, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  84. BHRN interview #4, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  85. BHRN interview #4, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  86. BHRN interview #28, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  87. BHRN interview #4, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  88. BHRN interview #28, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  89. BHRN interview #28, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2024. ↩
  90. BHRN interviews with 29 Rohingya WHRDs in Bangladesh between 2023 and 2024. ↩
  91. International Media Support, “Online Gendered Disinformation and Sexist Hate Speech,” March 2023, https://www.mediasupport.org/publication/online-gendered-disinformation-and-sexist-hate-speech/ ↩
  92. CEDAW (1992), “General Recommendation No. 19” (11th session, 1992), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html ↩
  93. CEDAW (2017), “General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General R ecommendation No. 19,” https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1305057?ln=en , article 6. ↩
  94. CEDAW (2017), “General recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19. ” ↩
  95. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  96. BHRN interview #10, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  97. BHRN interview #10, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  98. BHRN interview #10, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  99. BHRN interview #10, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  100. BHRN interview #13, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  101. BHRN interview #13, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  102. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  103. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  104. BHRN interview #7, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  105. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  106. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  107. BHRN interview #24, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  108. BHRN interview #6, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  109. BHRN interview #13, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  110. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩
  111. BHRN interview #2, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 2023. ↩

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BHRN is funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC), and private individuals. BHRN is based in London and operates across Burma working for human rights, the protection of minorities and religious freedom in the region.

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